Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using Equitable Remedies to Achieve the Purposes of the Fair Housing Act by Armstrong, Margalynne J.
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-1991
Desegregation Through Private Litigation: Using
Equitable Remedies to Achieve the Purposes of the
Fair Housing Act
Margalynne J. Armstrong
Santa Clara University School of Law, marmstrong@scu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
64 Temp. L.R. 909
DESEGREGATION THROUGH PRIVATE LITIGATION:
USING EQUITABLE REMEDIES TO ACHIEVE THE
PURPOSES OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
Margalynne Armstrong*
INTRODUCTION
In a national housing discrimination study, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD") concluded that African-American homeseekers
who visit four real estate agents can expect to encounter discrimination seventy-
two percent of the time when attempting to rent and forty-eight percent of the
time when seeking to purchase housing.I In one urban area of the United States,
there is at best a nine percent chance that an African-American homebuyer who
visits seven realtors will not encounter discrimination.2
The impact of such widespread housing discrimination goes beyond depriv-
ing access to individual units of housing. The discriminator's refusal to consider
the personal merit of the housing applicant denigrates the homeseeker's individ-
ual identity.3 Housing discrimination also denies African-Americans access to
the mainstream of American society and to the rewards of the American work
ethic. Americans are supposed to be free to live wherever they can afford to live.
By depriving free choice of housing, discrimination prevents individuals from
reaping the rewards of their labor. In the words of one victim: "I don't think I
should have to go through that in this day and age. We work hard every day.
We figure we should be able to live anywhere we want."'4
Housing discrimination results in residential segregation and ultimately
sustains segregated public education. Private residential segregation may undo
the results of years of school desegregation efforts, particularly after the United
* Assistant Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Professors Dorothy Glancy, Eric Wright, and Russell Galloway for their comments on earlier drafts
of this article and to express her gratitude to her other colleagues at Santa Clara University School of
Law for their help, support, and encouragement. The author is also indebted to research assistants
Jason Higa, Carol Koenig, and Lois Yoshida for their help in preparing the article for publication.
1. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No.
711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 15 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2176 [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Although discrimination in housing access can affect any racial group, this
article focuses primarily upon housing discrimination against black homeseekers. African-Ameri-
cans experience twice as much segregation as Asian-Americans and 60% more than Hispanic-Amer-
icans. Daniel Pederseu, Soul Searching in a Pioneering Town, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1988, at 37.
2. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 15, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2176 (citing
Boston, Mass. study reporting 91-98% probability that black homebuyers visiting seven realtors
would encounter discrimination).
3. See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of how individual discrimina-
tory acts often result in group injuries.
4. John Whalen, Shades of Gray, SAN JOSE METRO, Nov. 21-28, 1990, at 12, 13.
HeinOnline  -- 64 Temp. L.R. 909 1991
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
States Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education v. Dowell.5 As the fed-
eral courts consider requests to dismantle longstanding school desegregation de-
crees, school districts may now successfully cite residential segregation as the
culprit currently responsible for one-race schools. Formerly segregated dual
school systems may revert once again to one-race schools because of residential
patterns.
Housing discrimination is prevalent across the United States in spite of
Congress's longstanding prohibition against such conduct. More than twenty
years ago, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Provisions (Title VIII) of the Civil
Rights Act of 19686 to bar racial discrimination in the sale or rental of real
property. The Fair Housing Act's ("FHA") goals included fostering housing
integration and the eradication of residential segregation in addition to outlaw-
ing discrimination. 7 Title VIII is enforced primarily through lawsuits initiated
by individual victims of discrimination or by fair housing organizations.8 The
original Act limited punitive damages awards and the availability of attorney's
fees. 9 Commentators frequently cited these limitations as the primary reasons
that Title VIII was not effective in eradicating housing discrimination.' 0 Two
decades later, Congress responded by passing the Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988 ("1988 Amendments")." These Amendments eliminated the re-
5. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991). Dowell involved a school district's proposed student assignment plan
that, due to residential segregation, resulted in a number of one-race schools. The Dowell Court
wrote,
Dissolving a school desegregation decree after the local school authorities have operated in
compliance with it for a reasonable period of time recognizes that "necessary concern for
the important values of local control of public school systems dictates that a federal court's
regulatory control of such systems not extend beyond the time required to remedy the
effects of past intentional discrimination."
Id. at 637 (citations omitted).
6. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 - 3614(a)
(1988)).
7. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the goals of the Fair Housing
Act and its amendments.
8. Although Title VIII provides for federal enforcement when the defendant has engaged in a
pattern or practice of housing discrimination, federal enforcement of Title VIII is "severely limited."
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 16, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2177. During the
1980s, the Justice Department prosecuted only a handful of Title VIII cases, including a challenge to
a consent decree entered in a case opposing an integration maintenance program. James A.
Kushner, An Unfinished Agenda: The Federal Fair Housing Enforcement Effort, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 348 (1988). See infra note 23 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal enforcement of
"pattern and practice" cases.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (before amendment).
10. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 16, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2177.
Although weak remedies were part of Title VIII's ineffectiveness, this article will examine other
aspects of the Act that thwart its ability to achieve desegregation. See infra notes 54-57 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the limitations inherent in executing federal policy primarily through
individual enforcement efforts.
11. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 - 3631
(1988)). In describing the purposes of the Fair Housing Amendments Acts, H.R. REP. No. 100-711
notes that
[Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968] proscribes housing practices that discriminate
[Vol. 64
HeinOnline  -- 64 Temp. L.R. 910 1991
1991] DESEGREGATION THROUGH PRIVATE LITIGATION 911
strictions on attorney's fees and punitive damages 12 and provided an administra-
tive adjudication option for housing discrimination complainants. 13
Although the 1988 Amendments were designed to increase Title VIII's ef-
fectiveness in combating individual acts of housing discrimination, 14 Congress
failed to address the inherent limitations in using private litigation as a means of
correcting the public problem of housing discrimination. The 1988 Amend-
ments failed to address the fact that individual causes of action have had little
impact on residential segregation during Title VIII's twenty-two year history.' 5
The Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988 probably can never completely eradicate the national problem of housing
on account of race, color, national origin or religion, but it fails to provide an effective
enforcement system to make that promise a reality. This bill seeks to fill that void by
creating an administrative enforcement system, which is subject to judicial review, and by
removing barriers to the use of court enforcement by private litigants and the Department
of Justice.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2174 (footnote
omitted).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c). See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
1988 Amendment's less restrictive damage provisions. The 1988 Amendments also expanded Title
VIII's coverage to protect persons with disabilities and families with children from discrimination in
the rental or sale of housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Housing for "older persons" is exempt from the
FHA prohibitions against discrimination based on familial status. Id. § 3603.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b). The Act grants the fair housing administrative law judges ("AL's")
who will hear these complaints the power to impose civil fines civil and to grant "injunctive or other
equitable relief." Id. § 3612(g)(3). Either party to a dispute under Title VIII can still elect to pursue
a civil action in a U.S. District Court. Id. § 3612(a), (o). The original Fair Housing Act provided
for optional informal conciliation proceedings. Id. § 3610 (before amendment).
14. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2174.
15. GEORGE R. METCALF, FAIR HOUSING COMES OF AGE 205 (1988). Metcalf stated that:
The fair housing movement has focused primarily on the process of transferring individual
units of housing from whites to blacks, but has often neglected the larger issue of how
integrated neighborhoods are created and maintained ... If integration resulted from the
simple transfer of housing units from blacks to whites, segregation would have substan-
tially diminished during the 1970's .... But in the large majority of cases integration did
not persist because of resegregation.
Id.; see also Richard Sander, Comment, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities" The Problem
of Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 874, 894 (1988) (footnote omitted).
Of course, societal factors other than housing discrimination are also instrumental in perpetuat-
ing the residential segregation of African-Americans. For example, employment status and income
requirements necessary to obtain housing in currently segregated neighborhoods have played a ma-
jor part in stemming any substantial shifts in minority residential patterns. However, "[b]lack segre-
gation ... [remains] high across all levels of socioeconomic status whether measured in terms of
education, income or occupation." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 16, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2177 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, "the amount of occupational segregation
within either (the black or white) racial community is about the same, and is half as great as the
segregation between blacks and whites for any occupational group. D. Garth Taylor, Housing,
Neighborhoods and Race Relation" Recent Survey Evidence, 441 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
Sci. 26, 36-37 (1979). Courts tend to apply a circular approach to cases involving racial and ethnic
discrimination. "When discrimination in one area of society creates inequality in other areas, that
has often been seen as just the way it happens to be, as just facts, not as discrimination." CATHE-
RINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw 64 (1987).
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segregation because they fail to attack the evil in a systematic manner. Using
private litigation to address residential segregation results in treating the prob-
lem as one of individual access rather than as illegal activity aimed at a segment
of society. However, racial discrimination in housing access affects not only the
individual who has been denied a specific housing unit, but creates and main-
tains segregated neighborhoods, areas, and schools. Too often, an individual
action against a fair housing violation ignores the larger dynamics and conse-
quences of racial discrimination. 16 Although a particular act of discrimination
falls most directly upon the individual victim, the discrimination is aimed at,
and impacts, the entire minority group to which the individual belongs.' 7
Nevertheless, Congress relied on private litigation as the principal tool for
dismantling residential segregation.' 8 This article discusses private fair housing
litigation initiated by individual plaintiffs and examines why the relief awarded is
often incapable of remedying residential segregation. The article then proposes
that all individual litigants who bring Title VIII cases should obtain equitable
relief that will help achieve desegregation more rapidly. The article suggests
that group-oriented relief can be granted in individual cases in a manner that can
be reconciled with prevailing conceptions of statutory and constitutional civil
rights. Finally, it concludes that remedies for violations of Title VIII should
recognize the impact of the individual discriminatory act on the entire minority
community as well as the harm done to the individual victim. If expansive equi-
table relief is awarded regularly, even individual lawsuits could work to increase
the pace of housing desegregation.
I. GOALS AND WEAKNESSES OF TITLE VIII
Title VIII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin in most housing sales and rentals. From the outset, however, Title VIII
was riddled with deficiencies. First, about twenty percent of the country's hous-
ing transactions were not affected by the 1968 law. 19 Second, the political com-
promises necessary to pass the 1968 Act 20 resulted in ineffective and inefficient
enforcement provisions. 2 1 Victims of discrimination could file administrative
16. The relationship between housing discrimination and segregated schools, neighborhoods,
and areas is noted in A COMMON DESTINY, BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 225 (Gerald D.
Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989) [hereinafter COMMON DESTINY].
17. See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the intended and collateral
effects of housing discrimination on minorities as a group.
18. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). "The main generating force
[of Title VIII enforcement] must be private suits in which.., the complainants act not only in their
own behalf, but also as private attorney generals in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to
be of the highest priority." Id.
19. METCALF, supra note 15, at 3. Owner conducted sales of single family houses were exempt
if the seller owned no more than three such houses and did not use any printed or published adver-
tisements to sell the property. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1). Also exempt were rentals in dwellings that
contained no more than four separate units. Id. § 3603(b)(2).
20. See Jean Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN
L.J. 149, 153 (1969) (discussing political pressures on 1968 legislation).
21. See Robert W. Lake, The Fair Housing Act in a Discriminatory Market, 47 AM. PLANNING
[Vol. 64
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complaints with HUD, but HUD's authority was limited to providing non-bind-
ing mediation only. 22 Government-initiated enforcement of Title VIII was pos-
sible, but was limited to "pattern and practice" lawsuits prosecuted by the
Justice Department.
23
Title VIII's final weakness was its remedial provisions. Although compen-
satory damages were available, these damages were often inadequate. 24 Punitive
damages were also available, but limited by a ceiling of $1,000.25 Moreover,
attorney's fees were available only when the plaintiff was not "financially able to
assume attorney's fees."' 26 Thus, the Fair Housing Act thwarted the incentive to
bring housing discrimination actions by requiring the victims, rather than the
government or the violators, to bear the costs of Title VIII's enforcement.
27
When the victim's uncompensated costs of time and emotional involvement are
factored in, it is easy to understand why Title VIII's remedies were widely con-
sidered to be inadequate.28
Congress had considered several proposals to amend Title VIII in the late
1970s and early 1980s,'2 9 but abandoned these proposals prior to vote. In some
ASS'N J. 48, 50 (1981). "[Title VIII] moves to reduce discrimination through application of negative
sanctions in individual cases. This case-by-case approach is not cumulative, in that favorable resolu-
tion of one case has no direct impact on other instances of discrimination." Id. See also METCALF,
supra note 15, at 86; Deborah Kemp, The 1968 Fair Housing Act: Have Its Goals Been Accom-
plished?, 14 REAL EST. L.J. 327, 332 (1986).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (before amendment).
23. "Pattern and practice" cases are authorized
whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a person or group of
persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the
rights granted by this subchapter, or that any group of persons has been denied any of the
rights granted by this subchapter and such denial raises an issue of general public impor-
tance ....
Id. § 3613.
Pattern and practice lawsuits are based on repeated violations of Title VIII and, therefore,
require compilation and verification of victims and illegal acts of discrimination. The targets of
pattern and practice litigation are generally developers, owners, or managers of large housing com-
plexes. Although individual owners or corporations may own hundreds of units, the provision of
housing tends to be decentralized. Thus, pattern and practice litigation is directed at only a small
segment of housing providers. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 282-
300 (1983) and cases discussed therein.
24. Jay L. Lichtman, The Cost of Housing Discrimination: Assessment of Damages and Attor-
ney's Fees for Violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 10 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 963, 967 (1976). See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of why
compensatory damages cannot cover the full range of losses incurred when housing is denied.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (before amendment).
26. Id. "The court may grant as relief... reasonable attorney fees in the case of a prevailing
plaintiff: Provided, that the said plaintiff in the opinion of the court is not financially able to assume
said attorney's fees." Id.
27. Lake, supra note 21, at 50. In considering the 1988 Amendments Act, the House Judiciary
Committee believed that "the limit on punitive damages served as a major impediment to imposing
an effective deterrent on violators and a disincentive for private persons to bring suits under the
existing law." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 40, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2201.
28. See, e.g., James Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Genera-
tion of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1078 (1989).
29. In 1979, Representatives Drinen and Edwards introduced legislation to amend the Fair
HeinOnline  -- 64 Temp. L.R. 913 1991
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
instances, the proposed amendments were too ineffectual to garner the support
of fair housing advocates. 30 In other instances, it was apparent that the pro-
posed amendments lacked the support of a congressional majority. 31 By the late
1980s, however, both major political parties had decried the inadequacies of Ti-
tle VIII. 32 Even then-President Reagan called for some sort of reform of the
1968 Act.
3 3
Finally, in 1988, Congress amended Title VIII after reviewing extensive evi-
dence of continued housing discrimination in the United States. 34 Congress
identified the elimination of both individual acts of discrimination and residen-
tial segregation in general as goals of the amended Act, thereby reaffirming con-
gressional recognition of the dual nature of housing discrimination. 35 Despite
Congress's understanding of the larger problem of residential segregation, how-
Housing Act; another proposal was introduced by Senator Hatch in 1980. In 1980, Senator Mathias
introduced the Fair Housing Amendments Act. This bill was reintroduced in 1983, 1986, and 1987.
JAMES A. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING DISCRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY DEVELOP-
MENT AND REVITALIZATION § 10.04 (1983 & Supp. 1989).
30. METCALF, supra note 15, at 17; see also KUSHNER, supra note 29, § 10.04. (discussing
early proposals to amend 1968 Fair Housing Act).
31. METCALF, supra note 15, at 17.
32. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 16, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2177
("There is bipartisan agreement that a change needs to be made to the Fair Housing Act.").
33. President Reagan stated that "the Fair Housing Act has delivered short of its promise
because of a gap in its enforcement mechanism .... Reform of the fair housing act is a necessity that
is acknowledged by all." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 16-17, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2177-78 (footnote omitted). President Reagan's proposals to amend Title VIII
were criticized as "rhetorical." METCALF, supra note 15, at 17. Nonetheless, the Reagan Justice
Department opposed the final version of the FHA. William B. Reynolds, The Fair Housing Act of
1987?, 67 CONG. DIG. 171 (June-July, 1988). The Reagan administration opposed enacting the
FHA Amendments Act because it disapproved of the provisions for administrative adjudication and
the addition of familial status as a protected classification. The Department of Justice asserted that
administrative proceedings would not provide speedy resolution of disputes and would unconstitu-
tionally limit the right to a jury trial. The Department contended also that discrimination on the
basis of family status was not "wholly arbitrary." Id. at 175. See also Hearings on S.588 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 761-75
(1988) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearings] (statement of William Bradford Reynolds). Given the
administration's lack of support and a political climate that generally seemed disinterested in, or
actively hostile towards, civil rights, it is remarkable that the Fair Housing Amendments Act was
passed. The legislation may have been helped by the fact that the vote occurred during a presidential
election year at a time when the race appeared close. See House Backs Move to Strengthen Enforce-
ment of Housing Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1988, at A10 (legislative and political background of
Fair Housing Reform).
34. See, e.g., Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 33 (discussing defects of 1968 Fair Housing
Act).
35. In its discussion of why Title VIII needed to be amended, the House Judiciary Committee
noted that blacks continue to experience very high levels of residential segregation. LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 16, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2177. The U.S. Supreme Court
recognized the desegregation purposes of Title VIII: "Senator Mondale who drafted Sec. 810(a) said,
the reach of the proposed law was to replace the ghettos by truly integrated and balanced living
patterns." Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). Other Fair Housing
Act cases also have cited integration as a goal of the Act. See, e.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, N.C.,
682 F.2d 1055, 1068 (4th Cir. 1982) ("One purpose of the Fair Housing Act is to encourage fair
housing practices throughout the United States and to replace 'the ghettos... by truly integrated
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ever, the 1988 Amendments retained the individual cause of action as the pri-
mary means of correcting the evils caused by Title VIII violations. The
individual cause of action has been used primarily to combat only individual acts
of housing discrimination. As discussed below, however, private enforcement
may also be used to remedy patterns of residential segregation, if the courts can
be persuaded to take a more expansive view of the role of equitable remedies in
Title VIII litigation.
A. The Individual Action Approach in Fair Housing Enforcement
The case method of dispute resolution traditionally invokes the court's au-
thority over only the individuals or companies named as parties. In Title VIII
actions, while case law provides a few exceptions, the courts too often extend
relief only to the specific parties to the individual litigation.36 The individual
cause of action addresses neither the conditions that may have generated, or be
generated by, the dispute nor the societal repercussions of the illegal act. Indi-
vidual litigation focuses only on adjusting the interaction between the litigants. 37
Because Congress recognized residential segregation as a national problem and
provided Title VIII as a tool to combat that problem, fair housing litigation
must expand its focus to recognize and remedy segregated conditions. Title VIII
actions should seek to remedy segregation, even when the plaintiffs who brought
the suit would not be the direct beneficiaries of orders to integrate.
The individual cause of action may, at first glance, seem an appropriate
means of addressing racial discrimination in the provision of housing because
and balanced living patterns'."); Jorman v. Veterans Admin., 579 F. Supp. 1407, 1418 (N.D. I11.
1984) (Act designed to promote integration as well as other goals).
36. Robin West has described this approach, which focuses on the legal rights and protection of
the individual, in terms of traditional "liberal legal theory." Under liberal legal theory the law
inhibits autonomy only to the extent that an individual's acts of autonomy interfere with the right
that another individual has to her own autonomy. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988). Standing requirements focus on the injury to the individual and require
such individualized impact as a means of controlling the floodgates of litigation. "Distinct and pal-
pable injury remains the minimal constitutional requirement for standing in a federal court."
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 382 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring). Standing re-
quirements, however, do not mandate limiting the remedy of injunction to orders that benefit only
the named plaintiffs. For example, in McHaney v. Spears, 526 F. Supp. 566, 574-75 (W.D. Tenn.
1981), the court recommended a final decree that would order the defendant to convey the parcel
that was the subject of the litigation to the plaintiff and enjoin discrimination against other prospec-
tive purchasers.
37. Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw has criticized the narrow, individualized focus that the U.S.
Supreme Court has applied in recent cases involving racial discrimination. Crenshaw believes that
"the search for a particular perpetrator is not as important as seeking to remedy the conditions
which render the community in question subordinate to whites." Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw,
Foreword. Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 11
(1989).
Note that focusing on protecting individual rights, rather than on curing the condition of segre-
gation, has been used in a Justice Department pattern and practice suit to thwart programs designed
to maintain integration. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. 668 (E.D.N.Y. 1987),
aff'd, 840 F.2d 1096, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988). See infra note 51 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of integration maintenance measures.
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housing is obtained in individual transactions. Each transfer of housing involves
highly personal decisions with important financial ramifications for both the
homeseeker and seller or the lessor and lessee. 38 However, when the dynamics
of housing discrimination are more closely examined, the individual harm/indi-
vidual victim approach is clearly inapposite for two reasons. First, racism and
discriminatory behavior are essentially group-oriented. Second, individual acts
of discrimination result, in the aggregate, in larger social problems. Individual
acts and decisions create and perpetuate the residential segregation of entire ar-
eas, not just individual segregated units or buildings within generally integrated
areas.
39
1. Individual Action; Group Injury
Racial discrimination in housing deprives an individual of access to housing
without consideration of her individual attributes.40 Notions of group charac-
teristics form the basis for the decision to discriminate. 4 1 Each member of the
homeseeker's racial group is interchangeable because, in the eyes of the discrimi-
nator, the individual victim represents the whole of her race.4 2 The perpetrator
connects the object of his bias to his perceptions of people who are completely
external to the transaction. However, Congress has prohibited the use of such
irrelevant considerations in individual housing transactions.4 3
The Fair Housing Act recognizes that racial discrimination does not exist
in a vacuum. Although a violation of the Fair Housing Act may be directed at
38. The lessor generally intends to create a long-term, ongoing relationship with the lessee
because high tenant turnover is not usually economically efficient to the landlord. National surveys
show that lessors can lose up to three months rental income between the time one tenant moves out
and another moves in. Other expenses incurred from tenant turnover include advertising, cleaning,
painting, and paperwork. DANIEL GOODWIN & RICHARD RusDORF, THE LANDLORD'S HAND-
BOOK-A COMPLETE GUIDE TO MANAGING SMALL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES 20 (1989).
39. The prevalence and isolation of segregated minority areas is discussed in Douglas S. Massey
& Nancy A. Denton, Hypersegregation in US. Metropolitan Areas." Black and Hispanic Segregation
Along Five Dimensions, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 373 passim (Aug. 1989). See also infra note 51 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of the tendency for integrated neighborhoods to become segregated
minority neighborhoods.
40. "By definition, discrimination means to make a difference in treatment or favor on a class
or categorical basis in disregard of individual merit." Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 267 Cal. Rptr. 645, 660 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1990), rev'd in part, 284 Cal. Rptr. 718
(Cal. 1991). See also Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127
(1987) (contemporary view on persuasive nature of racial discrimination).
41. "Residential mixing is a particularly salient threat to whites' status and neighborhood val-
ues because blacks of the same social status are usually believed to have value characteristics of
persons of lower social status." Taylor, supra note 15, at 36 (emphasis in original).
42. Both Congress and the United States Supreme Court have recognized the group impact of
racial discrimination. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., the Court wrote: "The person on the
landlord's blacklist is not the only victim of discriminatory housing practices; it is, as Senator Javits
said in supporting the bill [Title VIII], 'the whole community.' " 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
43. Although not all housing transactions are covered by Title VIII, see supra text accompany-
ing note 19, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provides, in part: "All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
[Vol. 64
HeinOnline  -- 64 Temp. L.R. 916 1991
1991] DESEGREGATION THROUGH PRIVATE LITIGATION 917
an individual victim or family, the injury tends to have a cumulative impact on
other members of the minority group.44 Because housing discrimination victims
are denied equal opportunity to participate in the housing market their housing
alternatives are necessarily diminished. The minority homeseeker is forced into
a housing market that contains fewer choices. 4 5 Because other minority mem-
bers are similarly treated, due to their group affiliation, the competition for the
accessible housing increases. When denied the ability to move into majority
neighborhoods, minorities are left with only the alternatives of residing within
segregated minority neighborhoods or within the relatively scarce integrated
neighborhoods.46 Thus, individual acts of discrimination affect the racial group
as a whole.
Because minorities are denied access to housing in majority segregated
neighborhoods, there is often a high demand among people of color for resi-
dences in integrated neighborhoods. 47 Thus, when Caucasians move out of the
area, people of color are likely to purchase or rent the vacated dwellings, because
minorities who seek the advantages of integrated neighborhoods are often will-
ing to pay more for the housing than are white consumers. 4 8 Moreover, minori-
44. Although discrimination injures the entire minority group, there is little reason to bring a
class action suit when only an individual is denied housing. The injury experienced by both the
complainant and the group could be addressed by equitable relief that corrects residential segrega-
tion. Title VIII, however, does not bar class action litigation under appropriate circumstances.
45. DAVIS McENTIRE, RESIDENCE AND RACE 90 (1960). See also Christine Klepper,
America's Blind Spot: The Devastating Impact of Residential Segregation, in A SHELTERED CRISIS:
THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING IN THE EIGHTIES 164 (1983) [hereinafter CRIsIS] (report on effects of
residential segregation, its discriminatory nature, and proposed solutions).
46. The cumulative impact of individual acts of discrimination inhibits the formation of inte-
grated neighborhoods. However, there may be some benefits, primarily of political representation, to
the concentration of minorities in a given area. For a discussion opposing integration as an end in
and of itself, see Ankur J. Goel, Maintaining Integration Against Minority Interests: An Anti-Subju-
gation Theory for Equality in Housing, 22 URB. LAW. 369, 388-95 (1990) (critically discussing differ-
ent premises underlying integration and non-segregation); see also Francis F. Piven & Richard A.
Cloward, The Case Against Urban Desegregation, in HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 100, 105-07 (Py-
noos et al., eds., 1973) (discussing educational segregation, concluding that racially heterogeneous
schools are probably superior, but equalizing teacher and program quality are more important
goals).
47. "Most families who prefer integrated neighborhoods do so on a ... pragmatic basis-the
conviction that white decision makers will channel more real resources, rewards, and recognition to
institutions and communities serving significant numbers of influential whites as well as blacks." G.
Orfield, The Movement for Housing Integration, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POL-
ICY 26 (1986).
48. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Analysis of Property Values and Race (Laurenti), in
HOUSING URBAN AMERICA, supra note 46, at 267-70 (when given area of middle price housing
becomes integrated, increased intensity of demand from non-white segment of population tends to
raise prices relative to similar housing still in white market segment). See also Sander, supra note 15,
at 895 (in 1940s through 1960s, black demand for housing in integrated areas caused purchase prices
to increase). Paradoxically, because minorities have incentives to pay more than whites for the hous-
ing in integrated areas, the minorities are more likely to successfully compete for these units. How-
ever, minorities are excluded from even competing for the housing in majority segregated areas and
have fewer total housing options than white homeseekers.
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ties tend also to replace other minorities who leave the area.49 This turnover
causes what is known as the "tipping" phenomenon, whereby whites flee inte-
grated neighborhoods when they believe that minorities will soon compose the
predominant percentage of the neighborhood's population. 50 Very often, inte-
grated neighborhoods eventually become segregated minority neighborhoods. 51
Racial discrimination in the provision of housing thus has an inescapable impact
on the housing available to minorities.
Because individual acts of racial discrimination target and impact the entire
racial group, fair housing legislation should provide a remedial system that re-
dresses the injuries done to the group as a whole, as well as the individual victim.
In many cases, the relief that would actually achieve the goal of integration-
49. The vast majority of homes sold by African-Americans are purchased by other African-
Americans. African-American homeowners tend to receive less for their property; thus the housing
discrimination that discourages whites from purchasing in integrated areas limits the value of the
minority homeowners' equity. Goel, supra note 46, at 402-03.
50. Dorn Bishop, Fair Housing and the Constitutionality of Governmental Measures Affecting
Community Ethnicity, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1229, 1230-31 (1988). In surveys conducted in 1978, 46%
of the Caucasians questioned indicated that they would not move if large numbers of African-Ameri-
cans lived in the neighborhood. COMMON DESTINY, supra note 16, at 124.
51. Several federal court decisions and numerous scholarly works have examined housing au-
thority and local government measures that attempt to combat "white flight" and maintain inte-
grated housing by imposing racial quotas on the area or project's population. See, e.g., United States
v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988) (Title VIII
prevents indefinite use of racial quotas to maintain integration); United States v. Charlottesville
Redev. & Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp. 461, 471 (W.D. Va. 1986) (racially preferential housing assign-
ments to maintain integration impermissible). See also Bishop, supra note 50, at 1237, 1242-45
(describing quota systems and reviewing legal challenges to them); Goel, supra note 46, at 403-06
(analyzing ceiling quotas used to maintain integration). These measures are designed to stem white
flight by assuring white residents of integrated areas or projects that the minority population will
never grow beyond a certain percentage. Furthermore, in order to maintain an integrated popula-
tion, persons that left the area would be replaced by persons of the same race through assigning
priority to applications on the basis of race.
Integration maintenance measures, however, are offensive in that they seem to recognize some
sort of legitimacy or interest in white majoritarianism. They also raise disturbing questions of enti-
tlement and enforcement of entitlement rights. (Would a white resident have any rights to obtain an
order to enforce the program if the percentage of minorities in the project passed the designated
integration maintenance number?) These measures set a dangerous precedent, creating and main-
taining expectations that the government will protect some interests in remaining the racial majority
in particular geographic areas.
If Title VIII were enforced more consistently, the tipping phenomenon that transforms inte-
grated neighborhoods into segregated areas would not occur because there would be few communi-
ties to which whites could move to escape integration. Increasing the scarcity of segregated areas
should theoretically make the price of housing in such neighborhoods prohibitive to much of the
white population fleeing integration. To avoid the need for discriminatory integration maintenance
measures, institutional Title VIII enforcement efforts must be directed towards integrating neighbor-
hoods that have served as havens of segregation.
Although the use of racial quotas to maintain integration should be scrutinized warily, the
Department of Justice's "practice and pattern" litigation resources should not be focused on disman-
tling integration maintenance programs. It is sheer hypocrisy to use the Department of Justice's
limited fair housing enforcement resources in integrated areas when there remain numerous commu-
nities that are entirely closed to minorities. See generally Kushner, supra note 28, at 1115-16 (re-
viewing Justice Department arguments in case challenging ceiling quota).
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provision of the denied housing-is of no use to the plaintiff. Frequently, the
homeseeker has already found a substitute unit because the need for housing
cannot await the litigation's final outcome.5 2 Unless the tribunal is permitted to
order the defendant to integrate the housing with persons other than the plain-
tiff, the housing is likely to remain segregated at the conclusion of the proceed-
ings. Because the individual cause of action is Title VIII's primary enforcement
mechanism, judges who hear fair housing cases should use their authority to
provide effective remedial options. Further, because Title VIII consent decrees
can be tailored to provide integrated housing for minority members other than
parties to the action, plaintiffs should refuse to settle for only individual relief.53
2. Congress's Selection of Individual Enforcement
Relying on individual citizens to enforce federal policies presents a number
of barriers to achieving the legislative goal of integration. One problem lies in
the slow pace of litigation. A case-by-case approach is, inherently, a gradual
process. Another limit to effectiveness is that enforcement must be initiated by
victims generally not trained to detect violations. This limitation is crucial be-
cause persons who engage in housing discrimination are increasingly unlikely to
do so in an overt manner.54 Furthermore, relying on individual action allows
persons who oppose the law to disobey or disregard it until another individual
acts to stop them. The lack of concerted governmental enforcement efforts en-
courages noncompliance with the law. 5 5 When enforcement is relatively uncer-
tain, violators are more likely to risk that their violations will not be prosecuted
or that such prosecutions will be unsuccessful. 56
There are, of course, many reasons why Congress chose the individual
52. See, eg., Miller v. Apartments & Homes of New Jersey, 646 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1981)
(when defendants refused to rent apartment to plaintiff, plaintiffs forced to stay with relatives briefly
before they could find housing); Lucas v. Hooper, 381 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (M.D. Tenn. 1974)
(plaintiffs found and purchased another piece of property located in general area), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 942 (1982).
53. It is very important that plaintiffs who opt to settle their litigation demand that the defend-
ant consent to an order to integrate the housing. The 1988 Amendments give plaintiffs more lever-
age to insist upon such a settlement; if the defendant goes to trial and loses, not only is an order
prohibiting discrimination likely but the defendant may also be liable for plaintiff's attorney's fees
and punitive damages. Thus, the defendant risks a much higher judgment if she refuses to settle.
Moreover, stipulated judgments can subject the defendant to contempt proceedings if she should
violate the order in the future. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 280 (1990) (con-
tempt sanctions may be issued against individual city council members if contempt sanctions im-
posed against city to force compliance with desegregation consent decree fail).
54. Cf. Robert G. Schwemm, The Limits of Litgation Under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, in
THE FAIR HOUSING AcT AFrER TWENTY YEARS 43, 45-46 (Robert G. Schwemm, ed. 1989).
[hereinafter TWENTY YEARS].
55. Even "pattern and practice" actions pursued by the Department of Justice were of limited
effectiveness. By the early 1980s most of the "pattern and practice" cases were settled in pretrial
consent agreements where the defendant did not admit guilt. Although the defendants promised
future compliance, it was difficult to enforce the consent decrees. Lake, supra note 21, at 50.
56. Not every plaintiff who deserves to prevail does so. Additionally, the defendant, as the
owner of housing stock, is more likely to have the financial resources to "out-litigate" the plaintiff.
For an example of a guilty defendant prevailing at the trial level, see Marable v. H. Walker & Assoc.,
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cause of action as the primary means of enforcing the Fair Housing Act. Con-
gress may have been motivated by fiscal constraints. The individual cause of
action is a process that requires only indirect governmental financial support;
government expenditures are channeled into the judicial or administrative
branches rather than into direct enforcement procedures. Individual litigation
also allows the government to divert some of the criticism that accompanies just
but unpopular legislation. Whatever the failings of individual actions may be,
Congress is not likely to take a more direct approach to solving the problem of
residential segregation caused by the actions of private individuals, due to fiscal
constraints and to a perception that housing integration is not important to the
general majority public. 57
Congress's decision to limit the redress of residential segregation primarily
to individual action is ironic given the federal government's involvement in the
creation and maintenance of segregated private housing prior to the enactment
of Title VIII. Federal policy encouraged and sustained residential segregation
until the 1960s. For example, federal mortgage insurance underwriters were in-
structed to give low ratings to, or reject, properties located in neighborhoods
that evidenced the "infiltration of inharmonious racial or nationality groups."58
After the Second World War, the FHA and VA routinely denied loan applica-
tions for dwellings located in integrated or predominantly minority neighbor-
hoods.59 Furthermore, the FHA encouraged purchasers to include racially
restrictive covenants and "appropriate provisions for their enforcement" in
deeds for property protected by federal mortgage insurance. 60 Although these
covenants have not been enforceable since Shelley v. Kraemer,61 lack of legal
enforceability has not completely stifled their adverse impact on minority
homeseekers. 62
Because the federal government long sanctioned and supported housing
segregation, Congress's decision to place the burden of correction on individual
644 F.2d 390, 396 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendant won trial in suit that challenged refusal to rent to black
person; reversed on appeal because finding of no discrimination was clearly erroneous).
57. Although most white Americans do not object to limited integration, they seem to be un-
comfortable with more extensive interracial residential contact. Eighty-six percent of the whites
responding to a 1978 survey said that they would not move if black people moved next door, but
only 46% indicated that they would not move if large numbers of blacks lived in the neighborhood.
COMMON DESTINY, supra note 16, at 124. A more recent poll found that 40% of the black respon-
dents surveyed considered it very important to live in racially mixed neighborhoods, a view ex-
pressed by only 21% of the whites questioned. Richard Mofin & Dan Balz, Shifting Racial Climate;
Blacks and Whites Have Greater Contact But Sharply Different Views Poll Finds, WASH. POST, Oct.
25, 1989, at Al, A16.
58. CITIZEN'S COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A DECENT HOME 7 (1983) [hereinafter DE-
CENT HOME].
59. Id. at 14.
60. Id. at 9.
61. 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that enforcement of racially restrictive covenants denied
black home buyers equal protection of rights of ownership).
62. See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 33, at 767 (despite Shelly v. Kraemer and Fair
Housing Act of 1968, racially restrictive covenants still used) (testimony of Benjamin L. Hooks,
C.E.O., NAACP).
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victims without directly accepting the responsibility to correct the harms
wrought in part by federal policy is particularly troubling. 63 Past governmental
administrative and legislative decisions to discriminate against minorities con-
tinue to have adverse effects, including the perpetuation of ingrained attitudes
against residential integration."M Congress should have implemented more ap-
propriate remedies for the racial discrimination that the federal government was
so uninhibited in supporting. 65
This history of federally authorized segregation provides further justifica-
tion for an expansive grant of equitable remedies to increase the effectiveness of
individual Title VIII actions in achieving residential integration. Individual ac-
tions under the amended Fair Housing Act could be more effective in actually
dismantling segregation if individual plaintiffs would seek injunctions ordering
defendants to integrate the segregated housing regardless of whether the individ-
ual plaintiffs still desire the disputed housing. Both the original Fair Housing
Act and the 1988 Amendments authorize such relief.66 Although, under the
original version of Title VIII the only remedy available through administrative
proceedings was a voluntary conciliation agreement, 67 the 1988 Amendments
63. State and local governments also established laws and policies that contributed to residen-
tial segregation. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. I11. 1969)
(Housing Authority denied blacks residency in four projects in substantially white areas until 1954);
Dowell v. School Bd. of Okla. City, 219 F. Supp. 427, 432-33 (W.D. Okla. 1963) (detailing
Oklahoma statutes mandating segregated schools and providing for criminal penalties for violations
of segregation laws). See also Reynolds Farley, The Residential Segregation of Blacks from Whites:
Trends, Causes, and Consequences, in U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES, HOUSING DIS-
CRIMINATION (1985) (giving examples of racial segregation ordinances).
64. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "tipping"
phenomenon.
65. The Supreme Court has recognized Congress's authority to implement such remedies.
It is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more
comprehensive remedial power than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution
with competence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees. Congress may not
only induce voluntary action to assure compliance with existing federal statutory or consti-
tutional anti-discrimination provisions .... it may... authorize and induce state action to
avoid such conduct.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 US 448, 483-84 (1979) (plurality opinion).
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989), will probably make local governments less likely to initiate programs that
redress the systematic and institutionalized discrimination of the past, despite its current effects.
The Croson Court held that race conscious remedial programs implemented by local governments
must be linked to identified discrimination in order to survive an equal protection challenge. Id. at
511.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g) (as amended) (authorizing administrative law judges to grant in-
junctive relief); Id. § 3613(c) (court may grant appropriate injunction, including affirmative action);
Id. § 3610(d) (original court may order appropriate affirmative action). See also discussion of cases
infra note 121.
67. Id. § 3610(a) (secretary may resolve complaint by conference, conciliation, or persuasion).
See also Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 33, at 765 (1968 Fair Housing Act did not provide for
sanctions to compel compliance) (testimony of Benjamin L. Hooks, C.E.O., NAACP). See generally
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1, 16-17, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2173, 2177-78
(criticizing limitations of conciliatory measures to address housing discrimination).
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extend the availability of injunctive relief to administrative proceedings. The
1988 Amendments provided fair housing administrative law judges with wide
ranging equitable powers similar to those possessed by district court judges. 68
The new administrative law judges should be urged to grant integrating injunc-
tive relief in Title VIII hearings in order to effectuate the purposes of the original
Act and its amendments. Although individuals remain the primary enforcers of
fair housing laws, Congress, through the 1988 Amendments, clearly intended
the individual cause of action to be more effective in the future than it has been
in the past.
B. Damage Awards Alone Cannot Achieve the Purposes of Title VIII
1. Compensatory Damages Under Title VIII
The individual cause of action is an imperfect means of combating residen-
tial racial segregation. Title VIII's success in this regard was limited further by
the inadequate remedies provided in the original Act. Because the Congress that
enacted the 1968 Act was ambivalent about fair housing, 69 Title VIII's remedies
were not designed to truly achieve the various goals of a civil rights statute. 70
Under the original Act, it was unlikely that a fair housing suit would fully com-
pensate the victim of discrimination. Although the gamut of common law tort
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b) (administrative law judge shall preside over hearing on charge
filed); id. § 3612(g)(2) (administrative law judge shall make factual findings and legal conclusions);
id. § 3612 (g)(3) (administrative law judge may issue injunctive relief and assess civil penalties).
Congress provided an administrative hearing procedure under the 1988 Amendments specifically to
expedite and simplify fair housing litigation. See id. § 3612(d)(1) (discovery shall be as expeditious
and inexpensive as possible); id. § 3612(d)(2) (hearing shall be conducted as expeditiously and inex-
pensively as possible). In its section-by-section analysis of the 1988 Amendments, the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary reported:
Section 812(d) [42 U.S.C. § 3612(d)] requires to the greatest extent possible an expedited
and inexpensive discovery and hearing process, consistent with the right of the parties to
obtain a fair hearing. The Committee intends for both processes to be as informal and non-
adversarial as possible. The level of formality required in civil litigation is neither neces-
sary, nor, in the Committee's view, desirable.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 36-37, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2197-98.
69. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for a discussion of how political compromises
diluted the effectiveness of the Fair Housing Act.
70. Remedies under civil rights statutes generally have several functions that simultaneously
serve coercive, corrective, and punitive purposes. Because the primary goal of such statutes is to
eradicate discriminatory behavior, their remedies' foremost function should be to coerce wrongdoers
to comply with the law. However, because another important function of civil rights remedies is to
correct the results of illegal discriminatory behavior, corrective remedies include injunctive relief and
compensatory damages, including attorney's fees. Corrective remedies are traditionally awarded to
compensate the victim of discrimination, restore her to her rightful position, and to deter wrongful
behavior. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (compensatory
damages have dual function of deterrence and compensation for actual injury).
Punitive damages coerce compliance, and often enhance compensatory awards, particularly
when attorney's fees are not awarded. Punitive remedies differ from compensatory remedies in that
they punish the defendant and go beyond the minimum point necessary to compensate the plaintiff.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1977) (punitive damages punish defendant for
wrongful behavior).
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damages (other than uncapped punitive damages) have been available under Ti-
tle VIII since its enactment,7 1 Title VIII judgments have traditionally under-
compensated fair housing plaintiffs.72 The specter of a compensatory money
judgment with limited punitive damages and attorney's fees was not likely to
compel potential violators to desegregate voluntarily.
Compensatory damages fail to address the full range of losses that arise
from denial of equal access to housing. For example, uncompensated losses
might include the denial of access to better, or at least better-funded, schools 73
and to superior neighborhood services.74 It is difficult to measure the social and
economic benefits of exposure to mainstream lifestyles and values that are tradi-
tionally associated with the majority middle class.75 The inability to place a
precise value on such losses presents an obstacle to recovery. 76 Moreover, it is
difficult for plaintiffs to prove the certainty or duration of such losses. 77
71. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (court may award injunctive relief, actual damages, reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and punitive damages not in excess of one thousand dollars).
72. See Christine Klepper, America's Blind Spot: The Devastating Impact of Residential Segre-
gation, in CRISIS, supra note 45, at 168 (recovery has been too small to compensate victims); Jay L.
Lichtman, The Cost of Housing Discrimination: Assessment of Damages and Attorney's Fees for Viola-
tions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 10 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 963,
967 (1976).
73. In 1989, San Francisco School Superintendent Ramon Cortines reported that some teachers
and principals in the San Francisco school system questioned the need to offer advanced college level
courses at predominantly black high schools. Furthermore, educators who observed hundreds of
California schools reported that predominately minority schools were much farther away from com-
monly accepted educational standards than other California public schools. Diane Curtis & Nanette
Asimov, Dropouts Made, Not Born, Experts Say, SAN FRAN. CHRON., June 29, 1989, at Al, A6.
Justice Thurgood Marshall recently noted the qualitative difference between predominately mi-
nority and majority schools: "Because of the relative indifference of school boards towards all-Afro-
American schools, many of these schools continue to suffer from high student-faculty ratios, lower
quality teachers, inferior facilities and physical conditions, and lower quality course-offerings and
extracurricular programs." Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 643 n.5 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
74. Regular trash pick-up, well maintained roads, and good police and fire protection have been
cited as some of the services that increase due to gentrification and integration of low income neigh-
borhoods. See Daphne Spain, Urban Revitalization or Gentrification and Dislocation, in CRISIS,
supra note 45, at 178, 182 (residents of gentrified neighborhoods may demand more city services).
75. The Supreme Court has held that deprivation of the benefits derived from interracial as-
sociations is an injury in fact sufficient to confer constitutional standing. See, e.g., Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 375-76 (1982) (deprivation of benefits inherent in interracial as-
sociations is palpable injury establishing cause of action); accord Nur v. Blake Dev. Corp., 655 F.
Supp. 158, 163 (M.D. Ind. 1987) (standing to sue can be established by denial of benefits of interra-
cial associations) (citing Havens, 455 U.S. at 376).
76. Compensatory damages have been denied in cases involving similar intangible benefits such
as the deprivation of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura,
477 U.S. 299 (1986) (denial of substantive constitutional rights); Carey v. Phipus, 435 U.S. 247
(1978) (denial of due process procedural rights). Cf. Lichtman, supra, note 72, at 967 (compensatory
damages for mental suffering, as result of discrimination not fully realized because no standard for
measurement exists).
77. Where rental housing is involved, plaintiffs cannot prove how long they would reside in the
unit and thereby reap the benefits of the neighborhood because, in most jurisdictions, lessors or
lessees can determine unilaterally not to renew a lease. Although home sales are not subject to such
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Dignitary torts, such as slander and libel, have posed similar remedial
problems. The law of remedies relies on emotional distress awards and punitive
damages to deter conduct that causes legally recognizable losses that are difficult
to valuate with any precision. 78 Although the original Title VIII allowed com-
pensatory damages for emotional distress injuries, many jurisdictions required
serious injury or medically diagnosable symptoms of emotional distress. 79
Therefore, these damages could not offset the limitations on punitive damages
remedies. Thus, before the 1988 Amendments, Title VIII money judgments
tended to be low and, as a result, did not have much coercive impact.80 The
original Act's coercive functions were effectuated primarily through the availa-
bility of injunctive relief.
2. Remedial Functions of the Amended Fair Housing Act
The 1988 Fair Housing Act Amendments supplemented the coercive, cor-
rective, and punitive functions of the original Act. Congress lifted the limits on
an individual plaintiff's punitive damage awards,8 1 made recovery of attorneys'
fees possible without regard to the plaintiff's financial status,8 2 and instituted
civil penalties ranging from $10,000 - $50,000 in cases enforced by the Secretary
of Housing or the Attorney-General.8 3
Congress's decision to significantly enhance Title VIII's punitive remedies
supports future use of the Act's equitable remedies to provide relief beyond
merely restoring the individual plaintiff to the position she occupied prior to the
discriminatory act.8 4 Congress demonstrated its desire to punish discriminators
termination, plaintiffs will still find it difficult to establish that neighborhood services will not
decline.
78. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 903 cmt. a (compensatory damages only roughly cor-
respond to damages suffered). Punitive damages are sometimes used as a means of compensating
victims for intangible losses or to compensate victims for prosecuting lawsuits as "private attorney
general[s]." DAN B. DOBBS, A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES 205 (1973).
79. See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATER-
IALS 99-100 (1985) (detailing prerequisites to recover for emotional distress).
80. "Unlike employment discrimination cases, most housing cases have de minimus out-of-
pocket damages. Awards for humiliation and other intangible injuries are available, but have rarely
exceeded $20,000." Schwemm, supra note 54, at 46.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (no cap for punitive damage award in private suit); id.
§ 3614(d)(l)(b) (no cap for punitive damages in suit brought by Attorney General).
82. Id. § 3613(c)(2) (no financial disability prerequisite to award reasonable attorney's fees in
private suit); id. § 3614 (d)(2) (no financial disability prerequisite to award attorney's fees in suit by
Attorney General). The former provision had the unfortunate effect of discouraging litigation by
imposing the cost of FHA enforcement upon those most likely to encounter discrimination. Id.
§ 3612(c) (original Fair Housing Act) (reasonable attorney's fees available only to plaintiff's who
cannot afford to pay fees themselves). Minority homeseekers who were income eligible for middle
class housing, and more likely than poorer minorities to seek housing in white neighborhoods and
encounter discrimination, were forced to subsidize enforcement of the law under this provision.
83. See id. § 3612(3) (administrative law judge must impose penalties from $10,000-$50,000,
depending on defendant's record of discrimination); id. § 3614(d)(1)(c) (in suit brought by Attorney
General, court may assess penalties ranging from $10,000 -$50,000 depending on defendant's history
of discrimination).
84. Under the 1988 Amendments, the coercive functions of monetary remedies are coequal
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by amending the Act to impose fines and punitive damages that are not mea-
sured by the actual pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.85 In addition, imposing fines
that are paid to the government rather than to the victim of housing discrimina-
tion further illustrates congressional intention to emphasize the coercive func-
tion of the Act. Congress, in the 1988 Amendments, thus adopted a dual
perspective in combating housing discrimination: to compensate victims and to
punish violators.
Enhancing the coercive function of the Fair Housing Act by strengthening
the monetary remedies is an important step toward making the Act more effec-
tive within the context of the individual cause of action. Remedies for fair hous-
ing violations must be coercive if they are to have any impact on future
discriminatory behavior.8 6 For the Fair Housing Act to be truly effective in
dismantling residential segregation, however, equitable remedies must be used in
conjunction with monetary remedies.8 7 Successful litigation under the Fair
Housing Act should result in integrating the housing that was denied to the
plaintiff.8 8 Courts should not hesitate to award integrating relief. Congress has
designated the courts as the primary channel through which individual litigants
implement the federal policy against residential segregation. 89 Failure to grant
such relief is to ignore the legislative mandate.
II. REMEDIES THAT INTEGRATE HOUSING STOCK: EQUITABLE RELIEF IN
FAIR HOUSING ACTIONS BROUGHT BY INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS
Even though damage judgments may discourage future violations of Title
VIII, money damages do not necessarily integrate housing. Because Congress
has decreed that landlords and sellers must comply with the Fair Housing Act
as a condition of participating in the housing market, illegal acts of discrimina-
tion must be reversed as well as discouraged and punished. Title VIII violators
should not have the option of paying fines to avoid the law.90 Equitable reme-
with the compensatory functions because they present substantial financial disincentives against
committing acts of housing discrimination.
85. See statutory sections cited supra note 81.
86. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 37, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2198 (ad-
ministrative law judge should consider goal of deterrence when assessing penalties). With the 1988
Amendments, Congress finally provided deterrence remedies against individual defendants in cases
initiated by the Secretary of HUD or the Attorney General.
87. It should be noted that if the plaintiff wants a jury trial, she must seek legal (compensatory,
nominal, or punitive) damages. Similarly, no right to a jury trial exists if damages are not requested
in "pattern and practice" cases enforced by the Attorney General. See United States v. Westbanick,
63 F.R.D. 366, 366-67 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (plaintiffs not entitled to jury trial when only seeking in-
junctive relief); cf Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1974) (Title VIII actions seeking only
equitable relief unaffected by decision upholding right to jury trial in action for compensatory and
punitive damages).
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (detailing proscribed discriminatory practices in housing sales and
rentals).
89. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). By design, enforce-
ment of the Fair Housing Act is primarily dependent on private litigation. Robert G. Schwemm,
Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE LAW & POL'Y REV. 375, 376 (1988).
90. There is a risk that payment of compensatory damages might prove attractive to an FHA
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dies can be used to eliminate a defendant's ability to avoid the congressional
mandate against discrimination.
A. Temporary or Preliminary Relief
Title VIII authorizes temporary injunctive relief in the form of temporary
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions in civil actions instituted by pri-
vate persons9 ' or the Attorney General. 92 The law provides that such injunctive
relief may be granted as is necessary to "carry out the purposes of this sub-
chapter."' 93 Thus, the courts should consider whether preliminary injunctive
relief will further the Fair Housing Act's purposes, which includes the accom-
plishment of residential integration. The courts' discretion will be guided by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and common law rules governing the issuance
of preliminary injunctions. 94
To meet the traditional common law standard for obtaining a preliminary
injunction, plaintiffs must convince the court that (1) the complainant will pre-
vail on the merits in the Fair Housing Act proceedings and (2) failure to issue
temporary relief before a full trial on the merits can be held will result in irrepa-
rable injury to the plaintiff.95 Plaintiffs may also be required to prove that the
harm to them outweighs the harm that might result to the defendant if an in-
junction is granted. 96 Injunctive relief may also be limited by the rights of third
defendant, particularly when such damages are limited, as they may be when the plaintiff is able to
find alternative housing quickly. If white renters or homeowners are willing to pay a premium for
segregated housing, a judgment for damages may be cost effective to the defendant. The amended
Act's removal of punitive damages limitations will increase discriminator's monetary costs but does
not assure integration, as does injunctive relief. In addition to compensatory and injunctive reme-
dies, plaintiffs should seek restitutionary relief to ensure that any profit obtained from discrimination
is disgorged.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1).
92. Id. § 3614(a)(1)(a). Under the amended Act, administrative proceedings can be instituted
by the Secretary of HUD. Although Administrative Law Judges are granted wide powers to issue
permanent injunctive relief, there is no express grant of the power to issue preliminary relief. How-
ever, preliminary relief is available through the courts during the pendency of the administrative
proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(e) provides:
If the Secretary concludes at any time following the filing of a complaint that prompt
judicial action is necessary to carry out the purposes of this subchapter, the Secretary may
authorize a civil action for appropriate temporary or permanent relief pending final dispo-
sition of the complaint under this section .... The commencement of a civil action under
this subsection shall not affect the initiation or continuation of administrative proceedings
under this section and section 3612 of this title.
93. Id. § 3610(e).
94. Id. § 3610(e)(1) (temporary relief shall be issued in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
95. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (stating preliminary injunction
standards).
96. KUSHNER, supra note 29, § 9.05, at text accompanying n.239. See, e.g., Snowden v. Siano,
I Eq. Opp. in Hous. Cas. (P-H) 16,608 (D. Ariz. 1973), where the court specifically found that
Irreparable harm and damage or loss would occur to plaintiffs if the subject house and lot
were sold or transferred during the pendency of this action . . .[and that] [n]o special
harm, damage, or loss has been shown to occur or likely to result if defendant Siano is
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party transferees who obtain property interests from the Title VIII defendant
without notice of the charge filed under Title VIII.97
The typical preliminary injunction in private Title VIII litigation has been
aimed at preventing owner-defendants from transferring disputed property while
the action is pending.9 8 Such injunctions maintain the "status quo" and help to
prevent transfers to purchasers who lack knowledge of the fair housing claim.
Complainants who wish to preserve minority access to the disputed housing
must act quickly to obtain a preservational preliminary order and record it
against the defendant to give prospective transferees actual notice adequate to
satisfy the Act's requirements.9 9 Plaintiffs who have been denied rental housing
may find it difficult to preserve access to a specific rental unit, because the unit
may be rented before a preliminary injunction can be obtained. Nevertheless,
such plaintiffs can at least seek an order to preserve the defendant's next avail-
able unit. o0
Preliminary orders can be crafted to utilize the court's contempt power to
prevent transfers of housing to third party bona fide purchasers. 10 1 A landlord
who rents housing in violation of a fair housing preliminary injunction may then
be subject to civil or criminal contempt proceedings. Both civil coercive and
criminal contempt proceedings can punish injunction violators with imprison-
ment.10 2 The possibility of incarceration may strongly deter landlords from at-
restrained and enjoined from a sale or transfer of the subject property during the pendency
of this action.
Id. In actions where the plaintiff has obtained other housing, she must argue that the irreparable
injury lies in maintaining segregated housing and in the removal of the unit from the market of
minority homeseekers.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(d) provides that "[rlelief available under this section shall not affect any
contract, sale, encumbrance or lease consummated before the granting of such relief and involving a
bona fide purchaser, encumbrancer, or tenant without actual notice of the filing of a complaint with
the Secretary or civil action under this subchapter." A similar provision protecting bona fide pur-
chasers appears in the provisions for enforcement by the HUD Secretary at id. § 3612(g)(4). Con-
gress could further strengthen Title VIII remedies by deleting the bona fide purchaser provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 3613(d). If the minority applicant still wants the unit that was discriminatorily denied,
the intervening bonafide purchaser could be ordered to move at the defendant's expense. The deter-
rent effect would certainly be significant. If the plaintiff does not want the unit, the remedy should
make available future vacant units to minority homeseekers. Because the wrongful act of renting to
another effectuates the discrimination, while simultaneously blocking complete recovery, Congress
should consider permitting the court to set aside the wrongful transaction.
98. KUSHNER, supra note 29, § 9.05, at n.281. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)
(preliminary injunction prevented transfer pending trial).
99. 42 U.S.C § 3613(d) (availability of preliminary orders in private actions) and § 3 6 12(g)(4)
(availability of preliminary orders in Attorney General actions).
100. See, e.g., Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 350 (7th Cir. 1970) (defendant
ordered to rent similar accommodation on same conditions originally sought by plaintiff).
101. The preliminary order should be recorded or should require the landlord to post the prem-
ises with a copy of the injunction so prospective purchasers or lessees will have notice of the order.
Such notice can help prevent a defense to injunctive relief based on a conveyance to a bona fide
purchaser.
102. DAVID SCHOENBROD, ET AL., REMEDIES PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 264 (1990).
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tempting to limit the availability of permanent injunctive relief by transferring
the disputed property to bona fide purchasers.
Other uses of preliminary relief might involve court review of the defend-
ant's advertising and rental or sales approval procedures. 10 3 Preliminary injunc-
tions could also require regular reports to the court concerning applications,
rental vacancies, or sales until the litigation concludes in a final decision on the
merits. 104
B. Permanent Injunctions
Permanent injunctive relief is available in administrative and court adjudi-
cations under Title VIII, 105 as well as in "pattern and practice actions" initiated
by the Attorney General. 106 The 1988 Amendment's authorization to order
"such affirmative action as may be appropriate" is carried over and expanded
from the original Fair Housing Act. 107 This language specifically grants Title
VIII tribunals broad equitable powers by incorporating a traditional equitable
standard into the Fair Housing Act. 108 This traditional standard grants courts
sitting in equity the power to see that equity is done to all within its jurisdic-
103. See Margot S. Rubin, Advertising and Title VIII, 98 YALE L.J. 165, 167-69 (1988) (dis-
cussing use of human models in advertisements and the effect of race on conveying a discriminatory
message).
104. Reporting requirements are routinely used in "pattern and practice" case permanent in-
junctions. KUSHNER, supra note 29, § 19.13. Reporting orders during the pendency of the proceed-
ings should present no unusual problems to the court. Reports should include records of inquiries
about the availability of housing and the disposition of such inquiries because providing misinforma-
tion about the availability of housing violates 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (requiring housing providers to
inform consumers of available housing when asked).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3) authorizes administrative law judges to issue orders "for such relief
as may be appropriate, which may include .... injunctive or other equitable relief." The amended
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (relief available to private parties) specifies that, in a United States or
state court action, the court may: "award to the plaintiff actual and punitive damages, and... may
grant as relief, as the court deems appropriate any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary
restraining order.... (including an order enjoining the defendant from engaging in such practice or
ordering such affirmative action as may be appropriate)."
106. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(d)(1)(A) provides that in "pattern and practice" cases the court "may
award such preventive relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, or restraining order
... as is necessary to assure the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this subchapter."
107. Under the 1968 Act, after a complaint with the Secretary of HUD failed to result in
voluntary compliance with the Act, Title VIII actions could be filed in United States district court.
If the court found that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred or was about to occur, the
court could "enjoin the respondent from engaging in such practice or order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1982), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1988). The
amended Act specifically provides for affirmative action in cases enforced by HUD and by private
persons. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612(0)(3), 3613(c).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 3613. In Smith v. Town of Clarkton, N.C., 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982), the
Fourth Circuit upheld parts of a district court order described as "broad [and requiring] affirmative
action..., [it is] the type of order utilized time and again by other federal courts to heal the wounds
caused by violations of a plaintiff's statutory and constitutional rights." Id. at 1069. The Smith
court found such orders well within the federal court's "traditionally broad equitable power to fash-
ion remedies for the violation of the plaintiff's civil rights." Id.
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tion.' ° 9 Courts sitting in equity are not limited to restoring the plaintiff to her
rightful position; relief may extend beyond that point if necessary to effectuate
the ends of justice. 110 The 1988 Amendments, therefore, reject the narrow scope
of equitable relief applied by the United States Supreme Court in cases involving
governmental violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.III
There are constitutional limitations on the courts' power to order injunctive
relief," 2 and the Fair Housing Act recognizes these restraints in its statement of
purpose."t 3 Nonetheless, once the plaintiff establishes that Title VIII has been
violated, the Constitution does not restrict the scope of the courts' equitable
powers to orders that merely address the plaintiff's position. Federal courts
hearing fair housing cases are "fully empowered to eliminate the present effects
of past discrimination" ' "1 4 and may order appropriate affirmative action to
achieve this end.
To achieve Title VIII's goals, courts may need to require a defendant to
take affirmative action measures that provide relief for persons other than the
specific Title VIII plaintiff. That an individual plaintiff has found substitute
housing and is not inclined to seek an order that would place her in the defend-
ant's housing does not limit the court's ability to order affirmative action to
integrate defendant's housing stock. Constitutional concerns only require that
the plaintiff establish that the defendant has violated Title VIII. Constitutional
109. LAYCOCK, supra note 79, at 251.
110. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1977) ("Milliken IF') (equitable principles
allow federal courts to order remedial education in furtherance of school desegregation decree).
School desegregation remedies raise issues of judicial restraint and local government autonomy, id.
at 281, that are not presented by private housing discrimination cases. "No single tradition in public
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools." Milliken v. Brad-
ley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) ("Milliken I"). Thus, a federal court's equitable power may be less
than expansive in school desegregation litigation.
S11. Congress's rejection of a narrow scope for equitable relief is codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613(c). See supra note 105 for the relevant text of this provision. See supra notes 92-104, 105-10
and accompanying text for a discussion of potential applications of preliminary and permanent in-
junctive relief, respectively. See Milliken I for an illustration of the type of narrow relief granted by
the United States Supreme Court in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment. Milliken I limited
the scope of equitable relief in school desegregation cases to "restor[ing] the victims of discrimina-
tory conduct to the position they [would have] occupied in the absence of such conduct." 418 U.S.
717, 746. Further, Fair Housing Act remedies against local government defendants are limited by
the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. Relief "should not intrude into the orderly func-
tioning of local government any more than is necessary to remedy the specific ills brought on by the
violation of [the] statutory.., mandate." Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d at 1069. Of course, separa-
tion of powers considerations would not limit the remedies available from a private defendant.
112. For example, a court cannot order significant relief against someone who has specifically
been found not to have violated any law. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S.
375, 399 (1981). The federal courts' remedial powers can "be exercised only on the basis of a viola-
tion of law and could extend no farther than required by the nature and extent of that violation." Id.
See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976) (no injunctive relief allowed where plaintiff cannot
make showing of constitutional violation by city officials or police); SCHWEMM, supra note 23, at
246.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 ("It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.").
114. United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 1971).
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concerns do not prohibit the court from ordering the defendant to comply with
the act by filling the disputed housing with persons of the same race as the plain-
tiff.1 5 Violation of the statute triggers the court's ability to exercise its equitable
powers and "[o]nce invoked, 'the scope of a district court's equitable powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies.' "116
C. Fashioning Orders That Address the Group Harms of Individual
Complaints
The effectiveness of addressing the problem of residential segregation
through a case-by-case approach is limited. Unfortunately, because housing is a
need that often cannot be deferred, by the time the Title VIII case is heard, the
plaintiff has often obtained another dwelling. If this has occurred, an affirmative
injunction ordering the defendant to sell or rent the denied housing to the plain-
tiff could cause the plaintiff to incur additional losses, or, more likely, will be
worthless to the plaintiff." 7
Failure to address the plaintiff's urgent need for housing is not the only
shortcoming of remedial orders that apply only to the plaintiff. A remedial
maxim states that a plaintiff cannot recover reasonably avoidable damages. 118 If
reasonable substitute housing becomes available between the time of the viola-
tion and the trial, the plaintiff must choose between accepting the alternative
housing or risking that he may not be able to recover damages for any losses
incurred after the alternative became available. If the plaintiff moves into the
alternative housing, injunctive relief becomes less attractive to the plaintiff and
the defendant may argue that an injunction is no longer appropriate." 19 Thus,
although the plaintiff may receive a judgment for damages, the defendant's hous-
ing stock may remain segregated. Defendants should not escape integration in-
junctions simply because plaintiffs are required to minimize their damages by
accepting available substitute housing. The Act's broad authorization of equita-
115. For example, in Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apartments, 390 A.2d 1119 (Md. 1978), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld a state agency's authority under a state housing discrimina-
tion statute to order affirmative action (a program of tenant recruitment) in a case where the plaintiff
alleged only that he was denied an apartment due to race. Id. at 1127. The court relied on a state
law providing that, upon a finding that the respondent has engaged in any discriminatory act, the
Human Relations Commission may order the respondent "to cease and desist from the discrimina-
tion and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes of the particular subtitle"
involved. Id. (quoting MD. ANN. CODE of 1957 art. 49B, § 14(e)) (emphasis added). This is, of
course, language identical to that used in Title VIII.
116. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977) ("Milliken IF') (quoting Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)).
117. Additional losses might arise if a Title VIII plaintiff enters into a lease with someone other
than the defendant and then incurs financial liability for breaking that lease to avail himself of an
order granting access to defendant's housing stock.
118. See Doaas, supra note 78, at 186. This is often addressed in terms of minimization of
damages. A defendant may raise the issue of the plaintiff's failure to minimize damages. The de-
fendant will not be liable for damages that she can prove the plaintiff could have reasonably avoided.
119. The defendant could argue that money damages are an adequate remedy because the
plaintiff has obtained other accommodations.
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ble relief supports, and certainly does not limit, the courts authority to order the
defendant to reserve the housing until it can be filled by a qualified minority.12
0
Rather than issuing an order that merely prohibits future discrimination, courts
should affirmatively order integration.12
1
A plaintiff's act of mitigation in obtaining substitute housing does not di-
minish the original harm from the Title VIII violation. Persons other than the
plaintiff are harmed by violations of the act. These group harms do not, from a
practical point of view, support separate Title VIII or class action litigation, but
do impose injury. 122 An order to integrate the defendant's housing would ad-
dress the group injury imposed by individual acts of housing discrimination.
When fair housing litigation terminates in a judgment or settlement that results
in or preserves integration of the defendant's housing stock, there is at least one
more unit of housing available to a member of the victim's minority group.
123
This provides relief for the group injury by providing a valid substitute for the
opportunity that was impermissibly denied on the basis of group membership.
Because the essence of racially discriminatory behavior is that the victim's
individual identity is irrelevant to the perpetrator, the victim's individuality
should not shelter the discriminator from effective fair housing violation sanc-
tions. Limiting equitable remedies to those that compensate or house only the
plaintiff, substantially decreases Title VIII's effectiveness in redressing residen-
tial segregation. The recalcitrant defendant may continue to discriminate be-
cause even a successful Title VIII enforcement action may not result in
integration of his housing stock. 124 Compelling a discriminator to accept minor-
ity group members other than the victim removes the incentive to gamble that
any individual plaintiff will acquire other housing prior to the judgment.
Wide ranging equitable relief has benefitted minority group members who
were not parties to Title VIII litigation against public or large corporate defend-
ants.1 25 Courts should not be reluctant to similarly enjoin individual or small
120. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612(g)(3), 3613(c). Milliken II also supports broad equitable remedies
once a defendant has been proven guilty of discriminatory conduct. 433 U.S. at 281. See supra notes
108-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of traditional equitable principles.
121. Several cases under the original version of Title VIII have recognized that it is appropriate
to grant injunctions that benefit others beside the suing plaintiffs. E.g., Rogers v. 66-36 Yellowstone
Blvd. Co-Op Owners, 599 F. Supp. 79, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). In Rogers, the court sought to fashion
an injunction that would remove any lingering effects of past discrimination as well as prevent future
Title VIII violations. The Rogers injunction is drafted in broad terms, without specific reference to
the named plaintiff: "Defendant shall not withhold its consent to the sale or transfer... because of
an applicant's race, color or national origin .... [D]efendant shall then advertise the apartment's
availability for four successive Sundays in the New York Times and Amsterdam News. That adver-
tisement shall invite applications from qualified minorities .... " Id. at 86, 87.
122. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the group injuries result-
ing from housing discrimination.
123. This would apply to litigation brought under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b), & (d) (detailing
forbidden discriminatory acts in housing sales and rentals).
124. Some defendants may decide that it is economically worthwhile to pay damages, as long as
the housing remains segregated. See Schwemm, supra note 54 (damages minimal in housing discrim-
ination suits).
125. Equitable relief prohibiting discrimination against future applicants for housing has been
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business defendants in housing discrimination cases when the plaintiff no longer
desires the particular housing.'
26
Courts have traditionally fashioned group relief in other analogous civil
rights contexts. For example, minority groups have benefitted from corrective
relief in school desegregation cases even though the injunction could not benefit
the actual plaintiff.1 27 Similarly, once a violation has been established in em-
ployment discrimination cases, courts can remedy the continuing effects of past
illegal behavior without regard to whether persons other than the plaintiff are
the primary beneficiaries. ' 28 Litigants under the Fair Housing Act should urge
the courts to apply a similar approach in order to desegregate violators' housing
stock. Orders to integrate are the only way to completely cure the conditions
caused by the illegal action.1
29
Unequal treatment because of group affiliation should trigger relief that en-
sures interested group members access to the housing, particularly if the
demographics (i.e., a lack of minorities in the building or neighborhood) indicate
prior discriminatory behavior. Providing housing for persons of the specific vic-
tim's minority group is morally and factually justified. Moral justification stems
from the purposes of fair housing legislation and the societal goal of eliminating
discrimination in housing transactions. Factual justification may be found in
"the apparent intractability of racial segregation" in housing,130 and in the in-
herent limitations of enforcing the Fair Housing Act primarily through private
litigation. Congress's expression of concern about the need for a more effective
fair housing law, evidenced in the 1988 Amendments, further justifies broad re-
lief against residential segregation. Title VIII will not achieve the full range of
obtained in fair housing actions against owners of large apartment complexes and real estate devel-
opers. See, e.g., United States v. Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1971)
(injunction granted against future discrimination requiring defendant high-rise apartment owner to
maintain records so court could monitor compliance with order).
126. Some courts may hesitate, however, to order injunctive relief against defendants who pro-
vide small numbers of housing units due to the need for some continuing judicial supervision and
monitoring of the operation of an individual's business. But see supra note 121 and cases discussed
therein.
127. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977) ("Milliken .1") (prospective relief,
although compensatory, is constitutionally permissible).
128. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 445 (1986).
129. Even before amendment, the Fair Housing Act provided remedies that made corrective
relief available to non-party, indirect victims of the discriminatory act. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1)
(injunction preventing owner from engaging in discriminatory practices available in suits brought by
private parties) with 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612(c) (1982) (former section of Act allowing permanent injunc-
tive relief), repealed by Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 8(2), 102
Stat. 1619, 1625.
130. Cf. JOHN GOERING, HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 9 (1986). Goe-
ring states:
The desegregation of housing for minorities still appears as one of America's most unset-
tled civil rights frontiers, despite the passage of civil rights laws in the 1960s .... There
remain ... high levels of resistance and uncertainty about housing integration, with confu-
sion, ambivalence and disinterest seemingly as apparent now as they were thirty years ago.
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its purposes until remedies are granted that address residential integration as a
whole in addition to redressing individual acts of discrimination.
D. Other Relief
Other remedies that promote integration are available in Title VIII actions,
particularly in individual actions against discriminatory realtors. Much of the
housing discrimination that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s was "embedded in
the ordinary marketing tactics of ordinary housing agencies and agents."' 3 1
Realtors who violate the Fair Housing Act should be required to engage in "cor-
rective steering" whereby they affirmatively seek and recruit minority purchas-
ers/renters for housing in areas that have traditionally excluded minorities.1 32
Such orders would help to implement integration more rapidly than the tradi-
tional order to "stop violating Title VIII," by requiring the defendant to take
positive action, rather than passively waiting for an opportunity to "not
discriminate." 133
Under "corrective steering" orders, realtors should be required to affirma-
tively direct minority clients toward the areas that traditionally absorb white
flight as well as encourage white clients toward integrated areas. Corrective
steering could thereby help eliminate the "tipping" phenomenon. As integrated
housing became more prevalent, there would be less of a premium on individual
integrated communities, because minorities would have access to a larger pool of
housing and, thus, greater choice. Individual integrated areas would become
more racially stable as they would not be absorbing the majority of an area's
minorities who seek integrated housing.
Realtors may also be in a position to provide substitutionary relief to spe-
cific plaintiffs through corrective steering. If housing that was the subject of the
discriminatory transaction is unavailable, violators should be ordered to show
the plaintiff similar housing in the neighborhood where the violation occurred.
Such relief could begin to dismantle segregated neighborhoods, and help to elim-
inate the economic incentive to discriminate and segregate.
131. Diana Pearce, A Sheltered Crisis: The State of Fair Housing Opportunity in the Eighties, in
CRISIS, supra note 45, at 154-55.
132. Steering is "the direction of potential buyers or renters to specific neighborhoods on the
basis of race. Typically blacks are shown housing in all-black or racially integrated neighborhoods
while whites are shown listings only in all white neighborhoods." KUSHNER, supra note 29, § 4.06.
Discriminatory steering violates 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) as it makes a dwelling unavailable because of
race. United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978). Court ordered steering to elimi-
nate the effects of past discriminatory steering is "corrective" and has been part of affirmative injunc-
tions in fair housing cases. See, e.g., United States v. Real Estate One, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1140, 1142
(E.D. Mich. 1977) (broker ordered to educate salespersons, advertise in black owned newspapers,
and integrate its offices with black sales persons); cf. Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F.
Supp. 1313, 1315, 1321 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (non-profit group promoting integration and integration
maintenance did not violate Title VIII by providing whites with information about housing in inte-
grated neighborhoods and assisting blacks in finding housing in non-integrated areas).
133. The order to desist from violating the law does not undo the wrong that the defendant has
previously committed as much as it prevents future wrongdoing. Title VIII actions need to focus
upon undoing the harm of past residential segregation.
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When a realtor has engaged in steering or other practices that maintain
segregated areas, relief should include an order to provide neighborhood educa-
tion about fair housing laws and the community benefits of desegregation. Real
estate agents are in an excellent position to educate the more hostile residents of
segregated areas that property values need not be adversely affected by integra-
tion.' 34 Moreover, education may be necessary to prevent the successful Title
VIII plaintiff from suffering harassment from neighbors who, with the assistance
of realtors who have steered minority homeseekers away from the locality, had
been previously able to resist the integration of their area. 135
E. Duration of Equitable Relief
One concern that may cause judges to hesitate to order affirmative injunc-
tions is the duration of the ordered relief. Although courts are traditionally
reluctant to enter orders that require extensive court supervision, in civil rights
cases this reluctance has given way to the need to deal with the intransigence of
defendants.' 36 The duration of the order may be less of a problem in fair hous-
ing cases, due to economic factors. Court orders that require a defendant to fill
the vacancies with minorities, and prohibit any new occupancy until the order is
complied with, should inspire rapid compliance by causing the defendant eco-
nomic hardship.
If the defendant is the lessor of a number of units or is a developer or real-
tor, the court's jurisdiction over the case should remain open until the defendant
has integrated several units. Such supervision is necessary to protect the plaintiff
(or persons who benefitted from an order to integrate) from the additional inju-
ries that arise from the isolation of being the sole minority in the neighborhood
or building. Because Title VIII coverage of rental housing extends only to les-
sors who own four or more units, the defendants will own other units that, upon
vacancy, could be filled with members of the plaintiff's minority group. Any
court order should be recorded to give subsequent purchasers notice of the pro-
ceedings and to discourage defendants from selling the property to avoid the
integration order.' 37
134. Non-white entry alone rarely causes residential property to fall in price, and quite often
causes it to rise. Downs, supra note 48, at 267.
135. For examples of the violence and harassment experienced by minorities who move into
white areas, see Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119, 121 (N.D. I1. 1989) (house fire-bombed); Pina v.
Abington, 1 Eq. Opp. Hous. CAS. (P-H) 15,257, 15,495 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (terroristic acts). An
account of the use of community education and efforts to overcome such hostility appears in Sub-
committee Hearings, supra note 33, at 228-33 (statement of Jordan C. Band, Vice Chair, Community
Relations Bd. of Cleveland, Ohio).
136. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (courts will retain jurisdiction for
as long as necessary to supervise specific compliance with desegregation order, including monitoring
revision of local laws and regulations).
137. Good faith purchasers will not exist if constructive notice is established by recording. See
supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of preservational preliminary orders.
[Vol. 64
HeinOnline  -- 64 Temp. L.R. 934 1991
19911 DESEGREGATION THROUGH PRIVATE LITIGATION 935
CONCLUSION
Integrating injunctions overcome some of the limitations of the individual
cause of action under Title VIII without transgressing the boundaries of tradi-
tional equitable litigation. Courts hearing Title VIII cases can, and should, use
their equitable powers to order relief that integrates the defendant's housing
stock, without regard to whether the order benefits the specific plaintiff who
initiated the action.
After a plaintiff has proved a prima facie violation of Title VIII, the court
should look at the individual defendant's housing stock to determine if it is inte-
grated. If it is not, the court should issue an order that specifically requires the
defendant to integrate. Such orders would satisfy the corrective and coercive
aspects of Title VIII remedies. Moreover, such integrating orders would recog-
nize the fact that discriminatory behavior in housing access is directed at the
plaintiff's minority group as a whole and results in their exclusion from housing
without regard to individual qualifications. Finally, such orders would prevent
the defendant from circumventing the purposes of Title VIII, by simply "paying
her way out."
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